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NOTES
ROTH v. GARCIA MARQUEZ:
FITTING MOTION PICTURES WITH
INTERNATIONAL SHOES
I. INTRODUCTION
You're an American living in Paris. You write novels for a living.
After numerous efforts, your reputation begins to grow. Even so, your
bank account isn't exactly burgeoning.
Then one morning, a Hollywood producer shows up at your door.
"Loved your last book," the producer coos. "I have to have it." His voice
is hypnotic as he describes the fantastic major motion picture he will build
around your literary creation. You agree to talk more. He flies back home.
Telephone calls and faxes are exchanged.
You visit Los Angeles for three days to attend a conference on
American writers living in Paris. While you're in town, the producer
invites you to a social lunch and you dine with him in the Polo Lounge.
He presses you for a commitment. You remain reserved. You return to
Paris, to your cold-water garret and a half-dozen affectionate cats.
Soon after your return, the fax spits a piece of curling paper on the
floor. It is a letter from the producer. "Babe," the letter reads, "this
confirms our deal. I own worldwide non-literary rights to your last book.
You agree to share the risk and rewards of our venture by accepting ten
percent of the net profits from all our joint ventures."
You call the producer and sputter a protest. He listens impatiently,
then says, "Look, we made a deal at lunch. But if you prefer, I'll see you
in court." Two weeks later you receive a summons to appear in the U.S.
District Court in Los Angeles, California.
As you stare at the legal document, you think to yourself, 'Is it
possible this American court can decide my destiny?"
The answer is most likely, "Yes it can," based on the Ninth Circuit's
recent decision in Roth v. Garcia Marquez.!
This Note will argue that Roth sets a dangerously low threshold for
personal jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit when motion picture rights to
1. 942 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nelson, J.) (Judge Nelson is the author of a string of
important Ninth Circuit opinions dealing with personal jurisdiction questions).
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literary properties owned by offshore individuals are in dispute.2 This is
of no small concern. Indeed, in the wake of Roth, it seems that any foreign
citizen who agrees to enter into any kind of film deal with a Los Angeles-
based producer will necessarily be presumed to have "purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the [California] forum
by some affirmative act or conduct," and subject to the personal jurisdiction
of the U.S. District Court.' This, as will be demonstrated at length in this
Note, creates a fundamental inequity in the law.
The personal jurisdiction holding of Roth is based on erroneous
assumptions about how the motion picture business works. Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit is presently laboring under the mistaken assumption that any
motion picture produced by a California-based individual will necessarily
be largely produced or distributed from within California.4 That assump-
tion ignores the realities of the motion picture industry. What's more, the
court's assumption resulted in a holding which gives unscrupulous
producers a potent legal tool; a tool those individuals can be counted upon
to use. Indeed, in reaching its result, the Roth court inadvertently crafted
a potent threat to those offshore individuals who own valuable intellectual
properties.5
Roth's fatal flaw is that it ignores the reality of the writer-producer
relationship in the modem world of motion pictures. Following the court's
ruling, a wealthy producer angling for a desirable literary property can force
its owner to terms with the threat of litigation in the United States, where
it may be difficult if not impossible for the owner to defend his or her
rights. If the owner is a struggling writer who has created a fantastic
literary property, one potentially worth millions of dollars in the filmed
entertainment market, the potential for abuse by sophisticated deal makers
is startling.
Finally, this Note will discuss the need for a more flexible application
of existing personal jurisdiction tests, especially those used in determining
purposeful availment,6 to cases involving intellectual property rights in the
filmed entertainment industry. A better informed application of existing
mechanisms would allow for a more equitable result in the case of an
international literary rights dispute, of the Roth variety. Such a test would
also aid in leveling the playing field so that, whatever the specific property
2. 1&
3. lid at 620-21 (emphasis omitted).
4. Id. at 622.
5. Ud at 629.
6. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
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right, the poor and talented can do business with the rich and grasping on
a level playing field. The goal is to free offshore artists from the fear that
even speaking with a Los Angeles-based producer about a potential film
deal automatically exposes them to the risk of ruinous litigation in Southern
California's federal courtrooms.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Roth v. Garcia Marquez: Statement of the Facts
Richard Roth is an old-line Hollywood producer who has been
associated in the past with such filmed entertainment companies as Warner
Brothers and DeLaurentiis Entertainment. His credits include "Manhunter"
(DeLaurentiis Entertainment Group 1986)7, "Modern Bride" (MGM/UA
1983) with Diane Keaton, David Lynch's "Blue Velvet" (DeLaurentiis
Entertainment Group 1986), and "In Country" (Warner Bros. 1989).
Gabriel Garcia Marquez is one of the most renowned Spanish-language
literary figures alive in the world today. A citizen of Columbia, he was
honored with the Nobel Prize for literature in 1982.8 Currently residing in
Mexico City, Garcia Marquez has authored a substantial body of work
which includes a number of best selling novels.9 He is a man of consider-
able influence in Latin American circles, and counts Cuban leader Fidel
Castro among his personal friends.' The novelist has also earned a
reputation as a champion of Latin American causes and culture."
Carmen Balcells is the founder and president of Agencia Literaria
Carmen Balcells, S.A., a literary agency based in Barcelona, Spain. 2 A
Spanish citizen, BalcelIs also makes her home in the city of Barcelona.' 3
She has been Garcia Marquez' literary agent for more than twenty-five
years.
14
7. Films are identified by distributor.
8. Roth, 942 F.2d at 619.
9. Garcia Marquez' works include ONE HuNDRED YEARS OF SoLrrUDE (1970), AuTuMN OF
THE PATRIARCH (1976), CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FoRErOD (1983), and ThE GENERAL IN His
LABYRIm (1990).
10. Spencer Reiss & Peter Katel, Autumn of the Patriach, NEWsWEEK, Aug. 10, 1992, at 42.
11. Richard Boudreaux, Regional Outlook,- After The 'Lost Decade,' A Strong Latin Spirit,
L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 6. 1991, World Report, at 1.
12. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 5, Roth v. Garcia, 942 F.2d
617 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nos. 90-55713, 90-55751).
13. Id.
14. Id.
1993]
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In late 1986, Roth contacted Garcia Marquez in Mexico City to
express interest in making a film based on the well-received novel,'" Love
in the Time of Cholera.6 That December, Roth flew to Havana, Cuba, to
meet Garcia Marquez and discuss the project. 7 During their meeting,
Garcia Marquez told Roth that he would not consider selling the Cholera
film rights unless three conditions were met: (1) that Roth would pay
Garcia Marquez a substantial sum of money (which Balcells would later
specify as five million dollars); 8 (2) that Roth use a Latin American
director; and (3) that Roth shoot the film in Cartegna de Indias, Columbia,
where Cholera is set. 9
It was only natural that Garcia Marquez should authorize Balcells to
negotiate with Roth on his behalf, which is precisely what he did.20
Shortly thereafter, Roth wrote to Balcells and offered to purchase the film
rights for an amount far less than that demanded by Garcia Marquez.21
Roth and his agent, Peter Rawley, travelled to Barcelona to meet with
Balcells, and then Rawley made the trip again on his own in August
1987.' No deal was made, but telephone and telex negotiations contin-
ued.3
From time to time, Roth talked directly with Garcia Marquez about
efforts to locate a suitable Latin American director. Roth telephoned Garcia
Marquez numerous times, and visited the author in Mexico City twice in
1987 and 1988.24
In May 1988, Balcells travelled to California to attend an American
Booksellers Association convention.' She met with Roth and his counsel,
15. GABREum GARcA MARQUEz, LOVE IN THE Tnvm oF CHOLERA (1985).
16. Roth, 942 F.2d at 618.
17. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appeflees/Cross-Appellants at 5, Roth (Nos. 90-55713, 90-
55751).
18. The unusually large fee was meant to help fund the advancement of Latin American
cinema through Marquez' existing foundation. Id. at 6.
19. From the Defendants-Appellees'iCross-Appellants' briefs, the three conditions appear to
reflect a certain suspicion of the capitalist Hollywood film business by author Garcia Marquez.
See generally Defendants-Appellees'/Cross-Appellants' Briefs, Roth (Nos. 90-55713, 90-55751).
20. Roth, 942 F.2d at 619.
21. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 6, Roth (Nos. 90-55713, 90-
55751).
22. id.
23. Id. at 6-7.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id
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Alan U. Schwartz, during a break in the convention, but no deal was
reached. 6
In November 1988, Garcia Marquez visited Los Angeles for four days
at a friend's social invitation." During the visit, he encountered Roth
during a party and agreed to have lunch. During the meal, Roth described
the problems he was having locating a Latin American director for
Cholera.' Garcia Marquez suggested a Brazilian director.29 When Roth
raised the difficulties of filming in Cartegna de Indias, Garcia Marquez
agreed that the film could be shot in Brazil."
On November 17, 1988, Schwartz telefaxed a letter to Balcells in
Barcelona. The letter offered Garcia Marquez $200,000 for a two-year
option on the film rights to Cholera, plus a package of other payments to
be triggered by various events relating to the planned film.3
On January 19, 1989, Schwartz telefaxed a second letter to Balcells
outlining a revised offer to Garcia Marquez.32 The letter offered to raise
the initial option payment to $400,000, with the balance of the terms
identical to those contained in the November 17, 1988 letter.33 The
second letter also stated that Schwartz would "immediately set about
preparing a more formal agreement for Garcia Marquez' signature" which
would be forwarded at a later date.' Balcells signed the offer letter
without consulting Garcia Marquez and returned it to Roth by telefax the
following day.
35
The subsequent 25-page long-form contract prepared by Schwartz was
silent on the nationality of the film's director and location of filming.36
26. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appelees/Cross-Appellants at 7, Roth (Nos. 90-55713. 90-
55751).
27. Id.
28. d at 7-8.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id.
31. These included the right to extend the option for an additional year upon payment of an
additional $100,000, with all option payments to be applied against a total $1.25 million paid
upon exercise of the option. Another $400,000 fell due upon the film's release in video, and
$350,000 upon its broadcast television release. Roth also offered to pay Garcia Marquez 5% of
the net profits of the film. Roth, 942 F.2d at 619.
32. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 8, Roth (Nos. 90-55713, 90-
55751).
33. Id.
34. Appellants' Opening Brief at 4, Roth (No. 9-55713).
35. Id. at 5.
36. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 10, Roth (Nos. 90-55713, 90-
55751).
19931
358 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol.13
Balcells raised her objections to the proposed formal contract. More
negotiations followed, but no agreement was ever reached.37
B. Procedural History
In December 1991, Roth and his production company, Richard Roth
Productions, filed a complaint in the district court seeking declaratory relief
to determine the status of his rights to produce Love in the Time of Cholera
as a motion picture.38 Garcia Marquez and Balcells were named as
defendants.39
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over them and that, because there was no binding
contract, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.4 The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but granted the motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.4'
The plaintiffs subsequently appealed the dismissal, and the defendants
cross-appealed, arguing that the district court had wrongly decided the
personal jurisdiction issue.42 On August 8, 1991, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals filed its opinion affirming the trial court's decision on both the
contract and personal jurisdiction issues.43 It is the court's decision on the
personal jurisdiction question that is the subject of this Note.
37. Roth, 942 F.2d at 620.
38. Roth's position was that Garcia Marquez' demands for a Latin American director and for
a Brazilian shooting location were not made essential terms until after the January 19, 1989 offer
had been accepted. Appellants'/Cross-Appellees' Reply Brief at 6, Roth (No. 90-55713). The
federal appellate court appeared to accept Garcia Marquez' assertion that the nationality of the
director and the location of filming were both original conditions which were made known to
Roth at the earliest stages of negotiations. Roth, 942 F.2d at 619.
39. Roth, 942 F.2d at 617.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (b)(6).
41. Roth, 942 F.2d at 620.
42. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 11, Roth (Nos. 90-55713,90-
55751).
43. Roth, 942 F.2d at 629.
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. The Law of Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as in personam jurisdic-
tion, is simply the power of the court over the defendant's person.'
Absent personal jurisdiction, a court lacks the power to issue an in
personam judgment.'
The power of a federal court to hear a case based on diversity of
citizenship over non-resident defendants turns on two independent
considerations.' First, does an applicable state rule or statute potentially
confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant? 7 Second, is the assertion
of in personam jurisdiction in accord with constitutional principals of due
process? 4
In California, the applicable statute potentially conferring personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is referred to as the "long-arm
statute."49  The statute states that "[a] court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state
or of the United States."' 'Thus the statutory limitations upon jurisdic-
tion are 'coextensive with the outer limits of due process under the state
and federal constitutions, as those limits have been defined by the United
States Supreme Court."' 5
In a line of cases beginning with the seminal International Shoe Co.
v. Washington,2 the United States Supreme Court has defined the manner
by which due process limits state power to exercise personal jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendants. 3 The primary concern is one of equity, i.e.,
at what point does requiring foreign defendants to defend themselves in a
distant forum offend "traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial
44. BLACK'S LAW DicIoNARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).
45. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
46. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Roth, 942 F.2d at 620.
50. CA.. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1980).
51. Data Disc, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1286.
52. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
53. Data Disc, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1287.
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justice?"'  In the Ninth Circuit, those equitable concerns are most often
expressed in the context of a defendant's "contacts" with the forum:
We have interpreted International Shoe and its progeny as
allowing jurisdiction by California Courts over a nonresident
defendant if he has enough continuous contacts with California to
subject him to the court's general jurisdiction or if the specific
cause of action arises out of a defendant's more limited contacts
with the state so that California may exercise limited or specific
jurisdiction over him."
Thus, in assessing the equities of personal jurisdiction, the court looks
for evidence of "contacts" that the defendants may have maintained with
the forum state. If the level of contacts, judged by quality as well as
quantity, rises above a certain threshold, the height of which is largely fact
dependent, then personal jurisdiction is presumed to conform with
constitutional due process.56 This is the essence of what are widely
referred to as the "minimum contacts" defendants must have with a state
forum to satisfy due process concerns.
The decision in Roth v. Garcia Marquez turned on the question of
limited jurisdiction." There was no question in Roth that the defendants
did not have the kinds of continuous, high-quality contacts with the
California forum that would have subjected them to the court's general
jurisdiction.59
54. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
55. Roth, 942 F.2d at 620.
56. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-10 (1986).
57. Id. at 108-09.
58. Roth, 942 F.2d at 620.
59. International Shoe and its progeny are interpreted by the Ninth Circuit as allowing a
forum state to assert general personal jurisdiction over defendants if they have enough continuous
contacts with the forum of such high quality that due process is not offended. This "general
jurisdiction" standard relieves the court from having to balance interests to calculate the fairness
of asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant. In effect, once the defendants are determined
to have maintained the frequency and quality of forum contacts which make it equitable to assert
general jurisdiction over their persons, the courts conclusively presume such personal jurisdiction
satisfies constitutional Due Process. See id. at 620 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
However, if the defendants have only limited contacts with the forum state, the courts will apply
a complex series of balancing tests. The tests are gauged to determine whether the defendants
may be haled into court in the forum state without offending "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." See id. at 621; see also Data Disc, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1287.
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B. The Ninth Circuit Approach
1. The Three-Part Test
The Ninth Circuit follows a three-part test in determining whether
California may assert limited jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.' °
First, "the nonresident defendant must have purposefully availed himself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the forum by some affirmative act
or conduct."61 Second, "the plaintiff's claim must arise out of or result
from the defendant's forum-related activities."62 Third, the "exercise of
jurisdiction must be reasonable." 63
The first prong of the three-prong limited jurisdiction test-purposeful
availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum-is the key
prong of the test.64 This prong determines which party will bear the
ultimate burden of proving or disproving that the court may assert
jurisdiction without offending constitutional due process concerns.65
"Once purposeful availment has been established, the forum's exercise of
jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable. To rebut that presumption, a
defendant 'must present a compelling case' that the exercise of jurisdiction
would, in fact, be unreasonable."'
The second prong of the limited jurisdiction test, arising out of forum-
related activities,' is virtually a useless appendage under the facts of a
major motion picture controversy such as Roth, since one of the parties will
always live in California in such a dispute. The Roth court acknowledged
this reality and disposed of that prong in summary fashion.
6
8
2. Seven Factors Gauging Reasonableness
Almost as important as the first prong of the limited jurisdiction test
is the third and final prong, which requires the exercise of personal
60. Roth, 942 F.2d at 620.
61. Id. at 620-21.
62. Id. at 621.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 621-22.
65. Roth, 942 F.2d at 625.
66. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 386 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Burger King,
471 U.S. at 476), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1991).
67. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621.
68. Id. at 622.
1993]
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jurisdiction over a defendant to be reasonable.69 The Ninth Circuit uses
a seven-part balancing test to analyze the reasonableness of personal
jurisdiction. 0 No single factor is considered dispositive on the issue of
reasonableness.
The seven factors are:
(1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the
forum state's affairs;
(2) the burden on the defendant;
(3) conflicts of law between the forum and defendant's home
jurisdiction;
(4) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute;
(5) the most convenient judicial resolution of the dispute;
(6) the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and
(7) the existence of an alternative forum."'
The complex nature of the three-part limited jurisdiction test, one where the
third prong has its own seven-part balancing test, gives tremendous power
to the court in defining "traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial
justice 72 for any given set of facts. The reason is that the scales that
balance any given set of interests depend, for its subjective center, on the
perceptions, predispositions, and prejudices of the reviewing court. 3
3. Distinguishing Contract and Tort Actions
"It is important to distinguish contract from tort actions" in determin-
ing purposeful availment, the Roth court observed, since the acts of a tort-
feasor will necessarily differ in kind from those of a contracting defen-
dant.74 Accordingly, in considering whether Garcia Marquez and Balcells
had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities
in California by some affirmative act, the court distinguished their actions
from those of parties whose conduct was tortious.75
69. Id at 623.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see also Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Nelson, J.). The seven factors were first enunciated in Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina
Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1981).
72. Data Disc, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1287 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
73. See, e.g., Roth, 942 F.2d at 623-25.
74. Id. at 621.
75. Id
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By way of example, the court hypothesized tort-feasor defendants with
no forum contacts other than those resulting from their purposeful
availment to cause an effect inside the forum from outside the forum.76
Those tort-feasors, the court concluded, are subject to the jurisdiction of the
forum in which the effect occurred. This is because the defendants must
reasonably expect to be "haled" into court" in the forum where their
tortious act caused an injury."' This establishes that the "purposeful
availment" necessary to fulfill the personal jurisdiction test in a tort
situation is necessarily a minimal standard.
7 9
By contrast, when examining personal jurisdiction in a contract setting,
the Roth court declared that the judicial magnifying glass will examine the
"economic reality""° of the contractual relationship and the "future
consequences of the contract"' in determining personal availment.
This approach is consistent with that suggested in Burger King v.
Rudzewicz,"3 where the Supreme Court concluded "prior negotiations, and
contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and
the parties' actual course of dealing... must be evaluated in determining
whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the
forum."
' s
IV. THE ROTH COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Fitting Motion Pictures With International Shoes
In reaching its determination on the issue of limited personal
jurisdiction, the Roth court necessarily followed the familiar path first trod
76. This so-called "effects test' was first described in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89
(1984). In Calder, the U.S. Supreme Court considered an allegedly libelous tabloid article that
focused upon and caused harm within California, but was edited and published in Florida. The
Court held it proper for a California court to assert personal jurisdiction over those responsible
for the offending article. The Court reasoned that the "effects" of the out-of-forum conduct made
it reasonable that those responsible for the article would be haled into court in California. Id.;
see also Roth, 942 F.2d at 621.
77. Burger King, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
78. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621. See also Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund,
784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986); Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
79. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621.
80. Id at 622 (quoting Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1398).
81. FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1987) (Nelson, J.).
82. Roth, 942 F.2d at 622.
83. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
84. Id at 479.
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in International Shoe v. Washington.5  The dispute between Roth and
Garcia Marquez was a contractual dispute between Roth, a citizen of
California, Garcia Marquez, a resident of Mexico, and Balcells, a resident
of Spain. 6 The amount in controversy was in excess of $50,000.7
Therefore, the action sounded in diversity.8
The California long-arm statute allowed personal jurisdiction to be
asserted over the defendants "on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of [California] or of the United States."8 9 Federal and state
due process inquiries were therefore merged into a single analysis.'
Neither Garcia Marquez nor Balcells had any contacts with California
of a frequency or quality that would have caused the court to assert general
jurisdiction over their persons.9" So, the issue became one of deciding
whether the court might assert limited jurisdiction without offending
constitutional due process concerns.' As a result, the court was required
to determine whether Garcia Marquez and Balcells had the requisite
"minimum contacts" with California, which would assure that exercise of
jurisdiction would not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice."93
B. Applying The Three-Part Test
The Roth court began its analysis by attempting to determine whether
the defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of
conducting activities in California.94 The rule for evaluating this prong,
the court recited, is that "the defendant must have performed some type of
affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business
within the forum state."'
Garcia Marquez and Balcells argued that since Roth had initiated the
contacts and acted as the prime mover of the literary rights deal, he had
85. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
86. Roth, 942 F.2d at 619.
87. Id.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
89. CAL. Qv. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1980); Roth, 942 F.2d at 620.
90. Roth, 942 F.2d at 620.
91. Id
92. Id.
93. 1d (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation omitted)).
94. Id. at 621.
95. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621 (quoting Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1195).
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reached out to them, rather than vice versa.96 Since they did not purpose-
fully avail themselves of any benefit or protection of the forum, they argued
they could not be subject to California law.9
The court acknowledged Roth's arguments to the contrary, duly noting
the many telephone calls, returned letters and facsimiles which criss-crossed
the forum border.9 It also noted the Los Angeles visits, though their
effect on the ultimate resolution was down-played."
The evidence balanced almost evenly between the parties, the court
determined."° Thus, the nature of the contract under negotiation took on
overriding significance.' 0 ' "The point here is simply that the contract
concerned a film, most of the work for which would have been performed
in California," said the court.' 2 "Though neither side decisively triumphs
under this analysis, it appears that there was enough purposeful availment
here to compel a finding of jurisdiction on this prong."' 3
C. The Court Examines Reasonableness
After finding the purposeful availment prong satisfied, the court
summarily disposed of the second prong, noting undisputed evidence that
the action arose out of forum-related activities."° Hence, the court
directed its analysis towards determining the reasonableness of personal
jurisdiction, the third prong of the three-part test.'015
The court evaluated each of the seven factors to be weighed according
to circumstances in this case, and came to a decision on each. By a narrow
margin, the court found that Garcia Marquez and Balcells had purposefully
availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Califor-
nia."° It determined that defending a lawsuit in California would not
place so great a "burden on the defendants" as to "constitute a deprivation
of due process.""° It found no significant "conflict of law between the
96. Id
97. Id
98. id at 621-22.
99. Id at 621.
100. Roth, 942 F.2d at 622.
101. Id.
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id.
105. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623.
106. Id at 622.
107. Id at 623.
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forum and defendant's home jurisdiction," and likewise declared Califor-
nia's "interest in adjudicating the dispute" to be of little determinative
value. 8 The "most efficient judicial resolution" factor was deemed a
"toss-up," with the balance of facts favoring neither side conclusively."°
The "plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief' was found to
weigh in Roth's favor, "but not as decisively as in other cases."'10 Spain
and Mexico were found to constitute suitable "alternative forums" for
litigation, and so the seventh factor was found to favor Garcia Marquez and
Balcells.
D. A Holding Favoring Personal Jurisdiction
As a result of weighing the seven reasonableness factors, the court held
that it could assert personal jurisdiction over Garcia Marquez and Balcells:
"Once purposeful availment has been established, the forum's
exercise of jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable. To rebut that
presumption, a defendant 'must present a compelling case' that
the exercise of jurisdiction would, in fact, be unreasonable."
Appellees may be able to show that the exercise of jurisdiction
might be unreasonable, but the closeness of the question mani-
fests that they cannot do so in a compelling fashion.'
Subsequently, the court examined the trial court ruling that Roth could not
state a claim, and affirmed on the grounds that there was no actionable
contract formed between the parties."2 While the Roth outcome was a
favorable result for Garcia Marquez and Balcells, it created a disturbing
precedent for foreign owners of literary properties suitable for motion
pictures organized or produced in the United States.
108. Id at 624.
109. Id
110. Roth, 942 F.2d at 624.
111. Id at 625 (citations omitted).
112. Id at 629.
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V. CRITIQUE OF THE RoTH COURT ANALYSIS
A. The Court Makes An Assumption
The court in Roth held that it could equitably assert personal
jurisdiction over Garcia Marquez and Balcells."' However, the reasons
behind that holding are both intellectually intriguing and deeply disturbing.
Simply put, it appears the reason the Roth court felt bound to assert
personal jurisdiction over Garcia Marquez was because the deal for rights
to Cholera was a deal rooted in the motion picture industry."4
Indeed, the court's assumptions about where the film industry is based
and how the industry operates lay at the heart of its finding that it could
assert personal jurisdiction over Garcia Marquez and Balcells."I In many
ways, the assumption was quaint as that familiar melody, "Hooray for
Hollywood." The true message of Roth is that the Ninth Circuit still views
Hollywood as a geographic place, even though modem day film-makers
recognize that Hollywood is really more a term describing a global state of
mind.
B. Determining Purposeful Availment
The notion that defendants must purposefully avail themselves of the
privileges of a forum by some affirmative act before that forum may assert
jurisdiction over their persons was born out of concerns about basic
fairness. 6 "The [Supreme] Court long ago rejected the notion that
personal jurisdiction might turn on 'mechanical' tests, or on 'conceptualistic
... theories of the place of contracting or of performance."' 7 Instead,
the law requires an inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case to
determine whether the defendants have "purposefully established 'minimum
contacts' in the forum state."
' 8
113. Id at 625.
114. Id. at 622.
115. Roth, 942 F.2d at 622.
116. -This 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into
a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts." Burger King,
471 U.S. at 475.
117. Id at 478 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 474.
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In the Roth court's words:
Purposeful availment examines whether the defendant's contacts
with the forum are attributable to his own actions or are solely
the actions of the plaintiff. In order to have purposefully availed
oneself of conducting activities in the forum, the defendant must
have performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows
or promotes the transaction of business within the forum
state.
119
The Roth court took this language from Sinatra v. National Enquir-
er.n ° In turn, Sinatra relied upon the seminal Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court.'2 1 In Asahi, the Supreme Court further explained the
purposeful availment requirement by stating:
"Ihe constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether an
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process
"remains whether the defendant purposefully established 'mini-
mum contacts' in the forum state."... "Jurisdiction is proper
where the contacts proximately result from actions by the
defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the
forum State.
' 1
The Roth court also relied on Burger King v. Rudzewicz" 3 to provide
the important notion that the purposeful availment requirement ensures a
defendant is not haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of "random,
119. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621 (quoting Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1195 (citations omitted)).
120. 854 F.2d at 1195 (Nelson, 3.). As will be seen later, the Roth court relied heavily upon
the personal jurisdiction analysis it followed in Sinatra. However, this may have contributed to
distorting the result in Roth, since Sinatra was a tort case, while Roth sounded in contracts. See
infra text accompanying note 157.
121. 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality opinion). In this case, the Supreme Court expounded
upon the key nature of the personal availment requirement in a personal jurisdiction analysis.
Asahi was a Japanese manufacturer of tire valve assemblies who was named as a defendant in a
cross-action for indemnity by Taiwanese tire tube manufacturer Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co.
Cheng Shin brought the indemnity action after it was named as a defendant in a California
product liability action, though all Asahi tire valve assembly sales took place in Taiwan. The
California Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction over Asahi was consistent with the Due
Process Clause since Asahi knew its tire valve assemblies were incorporated into Cheng Shin
tubes later sold in California. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that mere awareness that
a product would eventually be sold in a forum was not enough to satisfy constitutional due
process concerns. Id.
122. 14 at 108-09 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474).
123. 471 U.S. 462 (1984). Burger King was a key case in the Roth court's jurisdiction
analysis. The court was particularly persuaded by Burger King, because it dealt with a similar
issue, i.e., the effect of contracts upon personal jurisdiction. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 621-22.
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fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another
party or third person.94
24
Moreover, the Roth court acknowledged that merely making a contract
with a resident of the forum state is not enough to create personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident.125 On the other hand, the Roth court
noted, when a contractual obligation creates a significant continuing
relationship, then due process concerns tend to melt away." 6 According-
ly, the Supreme Court found that, "with respect to interstate contractual
obligations, we have emphasized that parties who 'reach out beyond one
state and create continuing obligations with citizens of another state' are
subject to regulation and sanctions in the other State for the consequences
of their actions."
7
Even so, contracts which arise because of the efforts of others must be
distinguished from contracts created out of the defendant's active volition.
As the Roth court stated, "We have explained that 'the purposeful availment
analysis turns upon whether the defendant's contacts are attributable to
'actions by the defendant himself,' or conversely to the unilateral activity
of another party."
'' 28
Based on the foregoing, it would seem the personal jurisdiction
question presented in Roth should be easily decided in favor of no personal
jurisdiction. From the facts presented, Roth was the party whose actions
drove the negotiations for film rights to Cholera. Roth was the active,
proactive party, the one who pursued Garcia Marquez and Balcells, and his
124. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475)). In Burger King, a
Michigan resident had signed a twenty-year franchise agreement with a Florida-based fast food
restaurant chain. When the deal soured and the Michigan resident was haled into U.S. District
Court in Florida, lack of personal jurisdiction became an important defense. However, the
Supreme Court found the Michigan resident to have purposefully availed himself of the benefits
of Florida by virtue of his extensive and long-term contractual obligations. Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 487.
125. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621; see also Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Mach. Co., 913 F.2d 758 (9th
Cir. 1990). "A contract alone does not automatically establish the requisite minimum contacts,
necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Prior negotiations and contemplated future
consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing are
the factors to be considered." Gray & Co., 913 F.2d at 760 (citations omitted).
126. Roth, 942 F.2d at 622.
127. Id. at 617 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473).
128. Id. at 621 (quoting Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield, 800 F.2d 1474, 1478 (9th Cir.
1986)).
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pursuit took place almost exclusively outside of the California forum. 29
Garcia Marquez and Balcells played largely passive, reactive roles in the
negotiations.130 The proposed deal was a one-shot sale of literary rights
which would create no substantial continuing relationship between Roth and
Garcia Marquez. 3' In addition, unlike other cases where parties had
formed substantial and long-term contractual commitments, in Roth, there
was never any valid contract between the plaintiff and the defendants.132
But in spite of all this, the Ninth Circuit found in favor of personal
jurisdiction.
133
C. The Court Considers Future Consequences
and Takes A Wrong Turn
Despite what would appear to be significant obstacles in the way of
imposing personal jurisdiction on the defendants, the Roth court was
undaunted. The court's finding that the defendants had indeed purposefully
availed themselves of the benefits of the state of California did not turn on
the defendants' own activities, such as sending telefaxes or making
telephone calls."3 In fact, the court concurred with a substantial line of
authority holding that electronic international communications by and of
themselves do not rise to the level of quality contacts that might create
personal jurisdiction.'35
The Roth court found that two facts "marginally worked in [Garcia
Marquez' and Balcells'] favor: their minimal physical presence in the
129. Id. at 619. Balcells' and Garcia Marquez' chance meetings with Roth while they were
visiting California on other matters by themselves did not rise to the quality of contacts to
constitute purposeful availment. Id at 621. "Garcia Marquez and Balcells were in Los Angeles
for other purposes when each met individually with Roth. While we concede that negotiations
did take place at that time, it should be bome in mind that 'temporary physical presence' in the
forum does not suffice to confer personal jurisdiction." Id. (quoting FDIC v. British-American
Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1987) (Nelson, J.)).
130. Roth, 942 F.2d at 622.
131. Id. at 619-20.
132. Id. at 628.
133. Id. at 629.
134. Id. at 622. This was not for lack of arguing by the plaintiff. However, the court
followed Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1262 (9th Cir. 1985), which stated that "both this
court and the courts of California have concluded that ordinarily 'use of the mails, telephone, or
other international communications simply do not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the
benefits and protection of the forum state."' Peterson, 711 F.2d at 1262.
135. See Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1262; see also Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional
de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980).
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forum 136 and the fact that it was (Roth] who made the sedulous efforts of
solicitation."137  Then, relying on its own odd assumptions about how
motion pictures are made, the court lost its way:
While this is a very close call, a final and broader issue appears
to swing the first prong for Roth, namely the future consequences
of the contract.... The point here is simply that the contract
concerned a film, most of the work for which would have been
performed in California. Though the shooting most likely would
have taken place in Brazil, all of the editing, production work,
and advertising would have occurred in California. This is not an
instance where the contract was a one shot deal that was merely
negotiated and signed by one party in the forum; on the contrary,
most of the future of the contract would have centered on the
forum. The checks that Roth would have sent Garcia Marquez,
which appellees attempt[ed] to minimize, would have depended
upon activities in California and the United States. 38
This statement is fairly unequivocal about the future of the Cholera
film project. However, the statement assumes numerous facts which were
not apparent from the parties' briefs, and displays a certain naivete about
how the modern motion picture business works.
D. The Contract that Never Was
Overlooking the fact that, aside from representations about where
Cholera was to be filmed, neither Roth nor Garcia Marquez detailed how
and where production was to take place, the broad conclusions about the
future of the Cholera project were built on shaky ground to say the least.
Film projects are known for taking numerous twists and turns. Had
Roth been successful in negotiating the contract he wished, his option to
rights for Cholera would have been assignable139 and could have been
136. Aside from the two brief meetings in California, Garcia Marquez and Balcells were near
total strangers to the forum. Garcia Marquez had only visited California four times in his life for
a total of less than twenty days over a twenty-year period. He did maintain a small, dollar-
denominated account with a California bank, but it was not his primary account and was used for
transactions taking place outside the forum. Balcells had visited California only twice in her life,
for a total of approximately seven days. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants
at 5, Roth (Nos. 90-55713, 90-55751).
137. Roth, 942 F.2d at 622..
138. I4 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
139. Opening Brief of Defendants-AppelleeslCross-Appellants at 10, Roth (Nos. 90-55713,
90-55751).
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sold as easily to a British or Italian film company as to another American.
For that matter, Roth might have chosen to rely upon his relationship with
producer Dino Delaurentiis,'" who during the relevant period was
coaxing production to his non-union studio facilities in North Carolina. 4'
There is no reason editing need have taken place in California; that decision
generally depends upon the desires of the director. 42 So, Cholera might
not even have been edited in the United States. Similarly, advertising did
not have to take place predominately in California; it could just as easily
occurred in the venues where Cholera was to be exhibited. As for the
creation of that advertising, why overlook New York's Madison Avenue?
Ultimately, the source of any literary rights royalty checks paid by
Roth to Garcia Marquez would not depend upon California activities, but
rather, would depend on whether or not the film found a paying audience,
how large that audience might be, and where it was located. For example,
it would not be unusual for a film with foreign overtones to earn its largest
receipts overseas. In that case, the amount the picture might earn would
depend heavily on whether it is accepted in rich markets, such as Japan or
Germany, rather than in less lucrative markets such as Latin America or
Africa. In the domestic market, the picture's exposure in California would
depend almost exclusively upon a distributor's judgment about its reception
in that state. For that matter, if Cholera resulted in what is known in film
industry parlance as a "bomb," there would be no royalty checks whatsoev-
er. Since motion pictures in general tend to lose rather than earn mon-
ey,'" the court's analysis of cash sources leaves much to be desired.
E. The Court Effectively Removes Two Prongs
From a Three-Prong Test
In reaching a determination on purposeful availment, the court leaned
so heavily on its assumption that the film was to be made in Hollywood
140. Dave Kehr, 'Manhunter' Menaced By Overstyled Quarry, Ci. TRIB., Aug. 15, 1986, at
J.
141. David Tuller, Moviemakers Come To Main Street, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1986, § 3, at
4.
142. According to Garcia Marquez, the director of"Love in the Time of Cholera" was to have
been a Latin or South American national. Roth, 942 F.2d at 619.
143. Cf. Peter Dean, $19.8 Mil War Chest For U.K_ Video Drive, BILLBOARD, Feb. 23, 1991,
at 1.
144. David Robb, Net Profits: Breaking Even is Hard to Do, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 14,
1992, at 1.
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that the court effectively eliminated the second and third prongs of the
personal jurisdiction test.
From a practical standpoint, the second prong, forum-related activity,
usually will not be at issue in a literary rights dispute. The plaintiffs will
always be able to show that any rights contract tied to a motion picture is,
at least partially, related to the forum where the plaintiffs are based,
rendering the prong moot.145
As for the third prong of the test, i.e., the reasonable exercise of
jurisdiction, this prong will theoretically always act to prevent an unfair
result. In a literary rights dispute such as Roth, however, this prong will
always present too low a threshold to adequately protect against what must
really be termed a violationof constitutional due process unless is it applied
at the outset of the analysis, instead of at the end.1" The reason is, once
the defendants are found to have fulfilled the purposeful availment prong,
those defendants are immediately saddled with the burden of proving
personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable.14  "Once purposeful
availment has been established, the forum's exercise of jurisdiction is
presumptively reasonable. To rebut that presumption, a defendant must
present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would, in fact, be
unreasonable."' 48
There is no binding legal reason why reasonable exercise of jurisdic-
tion cannot be examined as a threshold question in personal jurisdiction
analysis. Judge Nelson followed this approach in at least one decision prior
to her opinion in Roth. 49 The Roth approach, on the other hand, with its
immediate presumption of reasonableness, turns what should be a
mechanism tuned for fairness and equity, right on its head.
F The Insurmountable Presumption
Because the Roth court found that Garcia Marquez and Balcells had
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in
145. Roth, 942 F.2d at 622.
146. Cf. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112-13 (1987).
147. Roth, 942 F.2d at 625.
148. Id (quoting Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 386 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on
other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1991).
149. FDIC v. British-American Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cr. 1987)
(Nelson, J.) ("because we find that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over [British American
Ins. Co.] is unreasonable, we need not determine whether the first two prongs of the [personal
jurisdiction] test are satisfied").
1993]
374 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
the California forum, it turned to the third prong of the personal jurisdiction
test to reach a final result.' The third prong, which demands that
exercise of personal jurisdiction be reasonable, required the Roth court to
balance seven discrete factors."'
When the balancing was done, the scales tipped slightly in favor of
unreasonableness, a result favorable to Garcia Marquez and Balcells' 52
Yet, the end result was something counter-intuitive, due in large part to the
rebuttable presumption created by the finding of purposeful availment.
Because Garcia Marquez and Balcells had the burden of rebutting the
presumption created by the first prong, purposeful availment, a close win
on the third prong's balancing test to determine reasonableness simply
wasn't enough to prevail. As the court noted: V'Appellees may be able to
show that the exercise of jurisdiction might be unreasonable, but the
closeness of the question manifests that they cannot do so in a compelling
fashion." ' 3 Therefore, in a close situation, a court following the Roth
rationale must always find personal jurisdiction.
It follows that in accord with Roth, the Ninth Circuit has deemed itself
the appropriate forum for any major motion picture dispute which might
arise. Call it, the court of the stars.
G. The Seven-Part Balancing Test Was Weighted Unfairly
Examining the court's step-by-step seven-part analysis demonstrates
how its assumptions on purposeful availment unfairly stacked the deck in
favor of finding personal jurisdiction.
1. Extent of Purposeful Interjection
The court did not consider the extent of purposeful interjection. The
court reasoned that, since the appellees had already been determined to
have purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting
activities in California, "there [was] no need to analyze this first factor
separately.'
54
150. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623.
151. l at 625.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 623.
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The court's refusal to analyze the extent of Garcia Marquez' "purpose-
ful interjection" appears somewhat result oriented. From the facts before
it, the court understood that it was Roth, the Los Angeles-based producer,
who was actively attempting to lure Garcia Marquez and Cholera into the
California forum. 55 If anything, the excessively high price initially
demanded for film rights, coupled with strict conditions regarding the
nationality of any director attached to the project and the specific location
for shooting, indicated a definite reluctance on Garcia Marquez' part to
avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California.,5 6
The court reached its conclusion on the extent of Garcia Marquez' and
Balcells' purposeful interjection with few words, and little more than
citations to Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc.157 and Haisten v. Grass
Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Inc.'58 as authority. 59 An exami-
nation of the facts in both of these cases makes the Roth court's reliance
upon them immediately suspect. In Sinatra, for example, the subject
defendant was a purposeful tort-feasor whose actions were focused on the
California forum, in stark contrast with the passive contractual posture of
Garcia Marquez."6  Haisten involved insurance contracts,'6 ' again, a far
cry from the unconsummated agreement which lay at the heart of Roth.
155. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621.
156. See Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 6, Roth (Nos. 90-55713,
90-55751).
157. 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nelson, J.). The defendant, a Swiss "rejuvenation"
clinic which had aided the National Enquirer in documenting a story headlined "[Frank] Sinatra
Injected with Youth Serum-He's Secretly Treated with Sheep Cells at Swiss Clinic," was the
subject of the personal jurisdiction analysis. In deciding that the clinic had purposefully availed
itself of the California forum, the Sinatra court noted that the clinic had (1) actively appropriated
the name of Frank Sinatra, a citizen of the state, and (2) advertised in the forum to solicit patients.
Id. at 1195. Needless to say, aside from the fact that it also concerns a celebrity and the question
of personal jurisdiction, a tort-grounded decision like Sinatra should carry minimal weight in
considering the questions raised by a contract case like Roth, since there is a fundamental
difference between asserting jurisdiction over a tort-feasor who has inflicted injury in a forum,
and a contract defendant who is simply at the wrong end of a bargain.
158. 784 F.2d 1392, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Haisten concerned an offshore insurance company
which sold malpractice coverage in California. Aside from the fact that Haisten involved an
actual contract, rather than a hypothetical agreement, the case is distinguishable from Roth on two
points. First, it is well-established that personal jurisdiction may be asserted over an insurer who
enters into insurance contracts within a forum. Cf McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957). Second, insurance is a highly regulated area and in the case of Haisten, no fewer
than two discrete statutes were controlling. Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1404-06.
159. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623.
160. Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199.
161. Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1395.
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2. Burdens on Defendant
The Roth court ignored the Asahi warning that if the defendant would
be unduly burdened by litigating in a U.S. forum, the "burdens on the
defendant" factor should be given "significant weight."' 62  The court
instead preferred to invoke the axiom that "modem advances in communi-
cations and transportation have significantly reduced the burden of litigating
in another country,"' thereby eliminating intercontinental distances and
language barriers as factors. It was almost as if the Roth court perceived
Asahi as having been decided in the era of covered wagons rather than in
1987.'6
In the context of a rights dispute between a producer and an author,
the court's reasoning was wholly inadequate. If the court had considered
Garcia Marquez' and Balcells' financial resources, their past experiences
with litigating disputes either in the United States or abroad, and their
facility with the English language, then perhaps its conclusion might have
carried more weight. Instead, the court seemed unwilling to engage in
much more than a superficial analysis:
At bottom, because Roth had no problems in his globe-trotting
endeavors to persuade Balcells and Garcia Marquez to sell the
film rights to him, he should not complain that litigation outside
the United States would be particularly onerous for him. [Garcia
Marquez and Balcells] have shown no similar propensity for
travel. Although this factor cuts in favor of [Garcia Marquez and
Balcells], "unless such inconvenience is so great as to constitute
162. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623. The Asahi court's admonition that "[t]he unique burdens placed
upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in
assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national
borders" is given short shrift by the Roth court. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 114 (1987). The burden on Garcia Marquez and Balcells to litigate a contract in the
United States could not have been significantly less than that faced by Asahi, which was
headquartered in Japan.
163. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623 (quoting Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199).
164. The court in Sinatra supported the "modem communications" axiom by noting the
foreign defendant clinic had long maintained an agent in the United States. "The continuing
contacts between the Clinic's United States-based agent and California translate into less of a
litigation burden than if the Clinic maintained no physical presence or agent within the United
States." Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199. Since neither Garcia Marquez nor Balcells had any such
agent or continuous contact with the forum, the invocation of the "modem communications"
rationale appears ill-used.
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a deprivation of due process, it will not overcome clear justifica-
tions for the exercise of jurisdiction. 165
The court found this factor favored neither party,'" and then set out to
find a justification for personal jurisdiction.
3. Extent of Conflict with Sovereignty of Foreign State
The court ignored the interests of Mexico and Spain in upholding the
rights of their nationals to license an acclaimed novel, one which arguably
could be considered a national literary treasure."6  The court instead
relied heavily on Sinatra for the proposition that "the factor of conflict with
the sovereignty of the defendant's state is not dispositive because, if given
controlling weight, it would always prevent suit against a foreign national
in a United States court."' 68  This is puzzling, given the previously
mentioned differences between a motion picture rights licensing controversy
and a Swiss rejuvenation clinic's unlicensed appropriation of Frank
Sinatra's name and persona.' 69
The main defendant in this action, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, is one of
the most acclaimed living Spanish-language writers, and as a Nobel Prize-
winner, can be counted among the greatest living writers in the world. 7
How is it an American court can decide that the interests of foreign
countries have not been invaded without even pausing to acknowledge the
status in those foreign lands of the man whose fate it is deciding?
To the court's credit, it does find that this prong "lines up" on Garcia
Marquez' and Balcells' side, but does not really explain why.'7
4. The Remaining Factors
The Roth court's analysis of the remaining four factors did little to
shed light on its final decision. In considering the forum state's interest in
adjudication, the court decided this factor was a toss-up, slightly in favor
165. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623 (quoting Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield, 800 F.2d 1474, 1481
(9th Cir. 1986).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 623-24.
168. Id.
169. Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1192; see also supra note 157.
170. Richard Boudreaux, After the 'Lost Decade,' a Strong Latin Spirit, L.A. TSIES, Aug. 6,
1991, World Report, at 1.
171. Roth, 942 F.2d at 624.
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of Garcia Marquez and Balcells. 72 The court's consideration of the most
efficient judicial resolution factor resulted in another "push.'" 3  Again,
erroneous assumptions about film financing and production make the
conclusion suspect. Furthermore, the court decided the convenience and
effectiveness of relief for the plaintiff factor in favor of Roth, though not
decisively." 4 Finally, Garcia Marquez and Balcells were favored by the
availability of an alternative forum factor, since litigation could be pursued
in Spain or Mexico as easily as in California." 5
5. Balancing the Seven Factors
Once the court determined that Garcia Marquez and Balcells purpose-
fully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting activities in the
California forum, 76 the burden shifted to the defendants to show why the
forum's courts should not have jurisdiction over the persons within the
forum.r
7
Given the facts of this case, how is it that the court found that Garcia
Marquez and Balcells had not presented a compelling case that exercise of
personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable? The answer must be that the
Roth court, in balancing the seven factors, did not afford enough weight to
the actual facts, and instead, let its assumptions about film-making control
its analysis. Perhaps the court believed that simply because Garcia
Marquez was a renowned, award-winning writer, that he must also be
wealthy enough to travel to and litigate in California.' The court let its
Hollywood-centric prejudices about the film industry color its thinking.
The consequence of Roth is appellate authority that sets a dangerous
precedent. This is especially true where the defending party is a well-
known artist with few financial resources and the plaintiff is a wealthy
business person who is adept at converting creative properties into large
sums of cash.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 624-25.
176. Roth, 942 F.2d at 625.
177. Id. (quoting Shute, 897 F.2d at 386, rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1991)).
178. Fame, however, is a highly unreliable gauge of personal assets, as any member of the
creative community understands. Thus, such an unspoken assumption, especially at the initial
pleading stage prior to discovery, is fraught with danger.
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H. The Court's Assumptions About How Films
Are Made Threatens To Short-Circuit Due Process
Since the days of International Shoe, courts have worked at defining
a personal jurisdiction standard rooted in fairness and equity.17 9 This is
not an area well-suited to mechanical tests or jurisdiction by rote. Instead,
the courts have striven to create intricately-tuned legal scales capable of
balancing and measuring diverse party interests.lO This web of balancing
tests is meant to assure that the plaintiff's interest in choosing a forum is
evenly matched to the defendant's interest in litigating in a place where,
even if it is not convenient, is a fair forum in which to mount a defense.
So how does Roth fit this complex tapestry? As is clear from the
discussion above, because the Roth court permitted preconceived notions
about the dynamics of a motion picture deal to color its analysis, its
personal jurisdiction decision opens the door to overreaching and injustice.
Regardless of Garcia Marquez' own ability to defend a lawsuit in U.S.
District Court in Los Angeles, future deal makers are bound to take notice
of the lessons Roth teaches. When negotiating a licensing deal for creative
properties with off-shore artists, an aggressive producer has been handed a
powerful weapon by the Roth court. The producer will know that as long
as a bargain is rooted in motion pictures and the agreement is sufficient to
sustain a motion to dismiss,"' the Los Angeles-based business person can
haul an artist halfway around the world to defend that artist's own creation.
What's more, that deal making leverage exists even if a predatory business
person is the sole aggressor and the artist is wholly passive. In the business
environment of the modem day motion picture industry, where a book or
a screenplay can generate millions of dollars in the right (or wrong) hands,
the personal jurisdiction holding of Roth makes little sense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The future consequences analysis and the "to be made in Hollywood"
assumption are what led the Roth court astray. In the case of literary
properties and motion picture productions, assumptions about the final form
the project will take are dangerous. Film deals by their nature remain
amorphous until fully consummated.
179. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464.
180. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and its progeny.
181. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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Admittedly, the motion picture world is an insular realm steeped in
arcane practices and odd business realities. It is not a world which is
readily understood by the outsider. Regardless, the business of entertain-
ment is a business of increasing importance in this global information age,
and filmed entertainment is of particular importance to California in these
difficult economic times.
But, this means the courts carry an extra burden when they are called
upon to decide cases which have the potential of making California more
or less hospitable to that rare and precious individual who is the creative
artist. Roth sets a disturbing precedent, and future courts should beware of
following its perilous path. To act otherwise is to risk that the artists of our
world will conclude that their last choice should be Hollywood.
William A. Daniels, Sr.
*The author was a reporter and critic for Daily Variety and Variety from 1984 to 1990 under
the byline Bill Daniels. As a former senior business writer for Daily Variety in Los Angeles, he
has written extensively about the domestic and international motion picture business as well as
film industry finance for both trade and consumer publications.
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